A Model of a Systemic Bank Run by Harald Uhlig
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








This paper has been written for and financially supported by the Carnegie-Rochester conference in
April 2009. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Harald Uhlig. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.A Model of a Systemic Bank Run
Harald Uhlig




The 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run, but not quite.  In particular,  it is financial institutions
withdrawing deposits from some core financial institutions, rather than depositors running on their
local bank.  These core financial institutions have invested the funds in asset-backed securities rather
than committed to long-term projects.  These securities can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside
investors. The question arises, why these investors require steep discounts to do so.  I therefore set
out to provide a model of a systemic bank run delivering six stylized key features of this crisis. I consider
two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset-backed securities:
uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection.  I shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse
investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective: in the former,
the crisis deepens, the larger the market share of distressed core banks, while a run becomes less likely
instead as a result in the adverse selection version.
I conclude from that that the variant with uncertainty averse investors   is more suitable to analyze
policy implications.   This paper therefore provides a model, in which the outright purchase of troubled
assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises








Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have provided us with the
classic benchmark model for a bank run. There, an individual bank en-
gages in maturity transformation, using demand deposits to ﬁnance long-
term loans, which can be liquidated in the short term only at a cost. If too
many agents claim short-term liquidity needs and withdraw their demand
deposits, the value of the bank assets are thus not suﬃcient to meet these
liquidity demands, in turn justifying even patient depositors to get their
money while they can: a bank run ensues. One policy conclusion then is for
a central bank to follow the classic Bagehot principle of committing to inject
liquidity to illiquid but otherwise solvent bank, in order to stop bank runs.
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007 and 2008 is reminiscent of a bank run, but
not quite, see Brunnermeier (2008) and Gorton (2009). First, this was (with
few exceptions) not a run of depositors on their local house bank, but a
run of banks and money funds on some core ﬁnancial institutions. Sec-
ond, the health of some core ﬁnancial institutions (I shall call them “core
banks” for the purpose of this paper) was called into question not because
of their commitment to costly-to-call long-term loans, but rather because of
the questionable value of a variety of “exotic” securities, most notably their
guarantees for particular tranches of mortgage-backed security derivatives
and credit default swaps. These are assets which could be marked to market
at least in principle. So, when a bank cannot repay its depositors because the
market value of their assets is below the value of its liabilities, the traditional
prescription is to declare the bank to be bankrupt and not to provide it with
additional liquidity.
In the current situation, this would mean for the aﬀected banks to sell
their questionable assets at market prices to meet withdrawals. There is a
widespread perception, however, that current market prices are below fun-
damental values, and that further sales of these assets are akin to ﬁre sales,
leading to further depression of the price of these assets, triggering additional
bankruptcies. This conclusion appears unpalatable to many and therefore,the Federal Reserve Bank and the Treasury have instead expanded interven-
tions where these assets will be bought at above-laissez-faire prices. There
is the perception that current events should be understood as some version
of a systemic bank run, despite the inapplicability of the original Diamond-
Dybvig framework. This creates a gap in our understanding. A new or at
least a modiﬁed theory is needed.
This paper seeks to contribute to ﬁlling that gap, and provide a model
(in two variants) of a systemic bank run. A systemic bank run is a situation,
in which early liquidity withdrawals by long-term depositors at some bank
are larger and a bank run more likely, if other banks are aﬀected by liquidity
withdrawals too, i.e. the market interaction of the distressed banks is crucial.
This is diﬀerent from a system-wide run, which may occur if all depositors
view their banks as not viable, regardless of whether the depositors at other
banks do to. The paper thereby seeks to provide a framework for analyzing
or evaluating policy options in a ﬁnancial crisis similar to the one experienced
in 2007 and 2008 through the perspective of a bank run model, which allows
for this market interaction.
It seeks to capture the following stylized view of the 2008 crisis.
1. The withdrawal of funds was done by ﬁnancial institutions (in par-
ticular, money market funds and other banks) at some core ﬁnancial
institutions, rather than depositors at their local bank.
2. The troubled ﬁnancial institutions held their portfolio in asset-backed
securities rather than being invested directly in long-term projects.
3. These securities are traded on markets. In the crisis, the prices for these
securities appears low compared to some benchmark fundamental value
benchmark (“underpricing”).
4. There is a large pool of investors willing to purchase securities, as evi-
denced e.g. by market purchases of newly issued US government bonds
or the volume on stock markets.
25. Nonetheless, these investors are only willing to buy these asset-backed
securities at prices that are low compared to standard discounting of
the entire pool of these securities.
6. The larger the market share of troubled ﬁnancial institutions, the steeper
the required discounts.
This view may be entirely incorrect: it is possible that the appropriate per-
spective is one of insolvency rather than illiquidity, and future research will
hopefully eventually sort out which view is most appropriate. Absent that
clariﬁcation, it is worthwhile to analyze the situation from a variety of per-
spectives: therefore, I shall proceed with the view as stated above.
It will turn out, that from this list, items 1 to 3 are straightforward to
incorporate, merely requiring some additional notation. Item 4 is easy to
incorporate in principle, but hard once one demands item 5 and 6 as well.
In particular item 6 will turn out to be particulary thorny to achieve, and
decisive in selecting one of two views of outside investors.
The key argument can be summarized as follows. Suppose that there
are some unforeseen early withdrawals, e.g. due to a shaken conﬁdence by,
say, some local banks or money market funds with respect to the viability of
their core bank. In order to provide resources to unforeseen withdrawals, the
core ﬁnancial institutions then need to sell part of their portfolio, thereby
incurring opportunity costs in terms of giving up returns at some later date.
Suppose that the remaining depositors (or depositing institutions) are the
more inclined to withdraw early as well, the larger these opportunity costs
are. If a larger market share of distressed banks and therefore larger addi-
tional liquidity needs drive these opportunity costs up, then a wide spread
run on the core banks is more likely: this creates a systemic bank run. I
therefore investigate, whether this increase in opportunity costs will happen.
After a literature review, I describe the model in section 3. I start from
an environment inspired by Smith (1991), in which depositors interact with
a local bank, which in turn reﬁnances itself via an (uncontingent) deposit
3account with one of a few core banks, who in turn invest in long-term se-
curities backed by locally run projects (think: mortgage-backed securities).
Clearly, the observable world of securities is considerably richer (and harder
to describe), but this framework may capture the essence of the interactions.
I assume that there are two aggregate states, a “boom” state and a (rare)
“bust” state. In the “boom” state, everything follows from the well-known
analysis in the benchmark bank run literature, see section 4: essentially,
things are ﬁne. More serious problems arise in the bust state. I assume that
the long-term securities become heterogeneous in terms of their long-term
returns, and that local banks (together with their local depositors) hold het-
erogeneous beliefs regarding the portfolio of their core bank. Therefore, some
local banks may withdraw early, even in the local consumption demands are
“late”.
I allow for outside investors, who in total have unbounded liquidity, to
become active in the market for the long-term securities which the core banks
seek to unload. I seek to understand why these investors demand steeper
discounts for the long-term securities than one would expect to see under
“normal” conditions, described in section 5.3. I investigate two variants in
particular.
The ﬁrst hypothesizes that a subset of outside investors with ﬁnite re-
sources has the expertise to evaluate the asset which the core banks wish
to sell, and that the remaining vast majority of investors is highly uncer-
tainty averse: they fear getting “stuck” with the worst asset among a diverse
portfolio, and are therefore not willing to bid more than the lowest price, see
section 5. The second reason is assuming risk-neutral investors together with
adverse selection, i.e. an Akerlof-style lemons problem: whatever the market
price, liquid core banks have an incentive to sell assets that will be a good
deal for them and a bad deal to the buyers, leading to a low market price,
see section 6. Both models generate a downward sloping demand curve or,
more accurately, an upward sloping period-2 opportunity cost for providing
period-1 resources per selling long-term securities from the perspective of the
4individual core bank, holding aggregate liquidity demands unchanged.
However, the two variants have sharply diﬀerent implications regarding
the last of the stylized features listed above. More precisely, with uncer-
tainty averse investors beyond a small and ﬁxed pool of expert investors, a
larger market share of troubled institutions dilutes the set of expert investors
faster, leading more quickly to steep period-2 opportunity costs for providing
period-1 liquidity. As more local banks seek to withdraw early and steeper
discounting sets in earlier, further local banks are encouraged to withdraw
from this as well as other core banks. This creates a systemic bank run.
By contrast and with adverse selection, a larger pool of troubled institutions
forced into liquidating their long-term securities leads to less free-riding of
unaﬀected core banks, thereby lowering the opportunity costs for providing
liquidity, see section 7. Since the models also have sharply diﬀerent policy
conclusions, I shall therefore argue to rather trust the policy conclusions from
the uncertainty averse model and to discard the policy conclusions emerging
from the adverse selection framework. In extension, one may therefore seek
a deeper analysis of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, using the tools of uncertainty
aversion.
2 Relation to the literature
There obviously is a large literature expanding the Diamond-Dybvig bank
run paradigm, and it includes investigations into systemic risk and the oc-
currence of ﬁre sales. Additionally and due to recent events, a plethora of
papers have appeared, seeking to provide explanations and coherent frame-
works. A number of these papers share questions and insights with the paper
at hand, but diﬀerences remain. A complete discussion is beyond the scope
of this paper and excellent surveys are available elsewhere. Allen and Gale
(2007), for example, have succinctly summarized much of the bank run liter-
ature, including in particular their own contributions, in the their Clarendon
lectures. Rochet (2008) has collected a number of his contributions with
5his co-authors which help to understand banking crises and the politics and
policy of bank regulation. A number of papers regarding the recent ﬁnancial
crises and avenues towards a solution have been collected in Acharya and
Richardson (2009), and that literature keeps evolving quickly. Nonetheless,
it may be good to provide at least a sketch on some related ideas and to
describe how this paper relates to them.
While the Diamond-Dybvig model is originally about multiple equilibria
(“bank run” vs “no bank run”), Allen and Gale put considerable emphasis
instead on fundamental equilibria, in which it is individually rational for a
depositor to “run”, even if nobody else does. In this paper I lean towards
this fundamental view, but take somewhat of a middle ground. For the
“bust” state, I shall argue, that some investors may believe the situation to
be suﬃciently bad that they withdraw, even if few others or nobody else does,
while others are more optimistic. This can generate a partial fundamental
run (based on the underlying beliefs), which may tip into a full-ﬂedged bank
run, see section 5.3.
Allen and Gale (1994, 2004b) have investigated the scope and conse-
quences of cash-in-the-market pricing to generate ﬁre sale pricing and bank
runs. In the context here, the idea is that the additional investors need to
bring cash to period 1, in case the core banks need to sell securities in period
1 in the bust state. If the bust state is suﬃciently unlikely, the incentives to
do so and therefore the additional liquidity is small: asset prices in the bust
state are then not determined by the usual asset pricing equations, but rather
by the amount of liquidity available. This may suﬃce as an explanation for
current events. However, there clearly are plenty of investors out there who
have liquidity available, when, say, the US government seeks to sell addi-
tional Treasury bonds. Why, then, should one assume the same investors to
forget to bring their wallet, when other securities are auctioned oﬀ at ﬁresale
prices? While technical and legal details and institutional frictions and barri-
ers surely play a key role in preventing outside investors to enter this market
quickly, see Duﬃe (2009), it still remains surprising that they have not done
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assumption for an endogenous reluctance of an otherwise deep market to buy
the securities which the core banks are desperate to sell. Thinking about this
reluctance and its implications is one of the key goals of this paper.
Diamond and Rajan (2009) have argued that banks have become reluctant
to sell their securities at present, if they foresee the possibility of insolvency
due to ﬁresale prices in the future: the option of waiting allows banks to
redistribute losses of depositors from the insolvency state in the future into
private gains in the case of continued solvency. Their paper helps to explain
the reluctance of banks to resolve their predicament by trading, but addi-
tional reasons are needed to generate the ﬁresale price in the ﬁrst place: the
latter is the focus of this paper.
While the popular press views ﬁnancial crises and bank runs as unde-
sirable desasters, e.g. Allen and Gale (1998, 2004a) have shown that they
instead may be an integral part of business cycles and can serve a socially
useful rule by partially substituting for a missing market due to the uncon-
tingent nature of deposit contracts. A number of regulatory and policy issues
arise as a result. It follows directly, that a policy avoiding bank runs or ﬁ-
nancial crises under all circumstances may be welfare decreasing. On a more
subtle level, Ennis and Keister (2008) have shown that ex-post eﬃcient policy
responses to a bank run of allowing urgent depositors to withdraw may ac-
tually increase the incentives to participate in a bank run and the conditions
for a self-fulﬁlling bank run in the ﬁrst place. Given these and a number
of related results, the focus of this paper is on the positive analysis rather
than a normative “second-best” analysis, though this would be a desirable
part of further research (or a future draft of this paper). Likewise (and re-
garding potentially welfare-improving private sector solutions), we assume a
particular structure of the contracts, markets and asymmetries of beliefs and
information, rather than requiring contracts to be optimal, as in Green and
Lin (2003) or Ennis and Keister (2008).
There is a large literature on systemic risk and contagion, both for inter-
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well as for banking crises. For example, Cifuentes et al (2005) have studied
the interplay between uncontingent capital adequacy requirements and the
endogenous collapse of prices and balance sheets, as banks need to unload
assets in order to meet these requirements. They assume that demand for
these assets is downward sloping: this paper seeks to investigate why. Allen
and Gale (2000) have studied the possibility for contagion in a sparse net-
work of banks interlinked by mutual demand deposits, where a collapse of
one bank can lead to a domino eﬀect per their large withdrawals on their
direct neighbor. Here, a hierarchy is instead assumed, where local banks
hold deposit contracts on core banks, who in turn use the market to obtain
liquidity, rather than other core banks. Diamond and Rajan (2005) have in-
vestigated the contagious nature of bank failures, arguing that bank failures
can shrink the common pool of liquidity, thereby possibly leading a meltdown
of the entire system. They assume that the returns on long-term projects can
only be obtained by banks, and that any securities written on these returns
can only be traded by banks. While this paper shares the central idea of a
shortage of a common pool of liquidity and the feature, that projects are run
by “managing” (local) banks, I allow outside investors to buy the securities
written on these projects and collect their returns. In essence, I assume that
a mortgage-backed security will pay its return, irrespective of who actually
holds that security. If that perspective is appropriate, then one needs to
understand why outside deep-pocket investors do not buy these securities, if
they are indeed severely undervalued.
Uncertainty aversion - or Knightian uncertainty - is a crucial ingredient in
this paper. There obviously is a large literature investigating its implications
for asset markets and equilibria. For some recent examples, one may want to
consult Hansen and Sargent (2008) and Backus-Routledge-Zin (2009), and
the references therein.
83 The model
There are three periods, t = 0,1,2. There are two fundamental aggregate
states: “boom” and “bust”. The aggregate state will be learned by all par-
ticipants in period 1. There are four types of agents or agencies:
1. Depositors in locations s ∈ [0,1].
2. Local banks in locations s ∈ [0,1].
3. Core banks, n = 1,...,N.
4. Outside investors i ∈ [0,∞).
There are two types of assets
1. A heterogeneous pool of long-term securities (“mortgage backed secu-
rities”), backed by long-term projects in locations s ∈ [0,1].
2. A short term security, providing a safe return of 1.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the model: there, I have
drawn the unit interval as a unit circle.
Let me describe each in turn. As in Allen and Gale (2007), I assume
that depositors have one unit of resources in period 0, but that they care
about consumption either in period 1 (“early consumer”) or in period 2
(“late consumer”). As in Smith (1983), I assume that all depositors at one
location are of the same type. They learn their type in period 1. I assume
that a fraction 0 < ϕ < 1 of locations has early consumers and a fraction
1 − ϕ has late consumers. I assume that the realization of the early/late
resolution is iid across locations and that depositors are evenly distributed
across locations. I assume that depositors learn of their type in period 1.
Ex-ante utility is therefore given by














Figure 1: A graphical representation of the model.
where c1 and c2 denotes consumption at date 1, if the consumer is of the
early type and c2 denotes consumption at date 2, if the consumer is of the
late type and where u( ) satisﬁes standard properties. This heterogeneity in
consumption preference induces a role for liquidity provision and maturity
transformation, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and the related literature.
I assume that depositors only bank with the local bank in the same location.
This lack of diversiﬁcation can be thought of as arising from some unspeciﬁed
cost to diversiﬁcation, e.g. the impossibility for banks or depositors to travel
to other locations. An alternative way to think about this is that s actu-
10ally enumerates the deposit banks in existence and each location denotes its
customer base, noting that depositors are observed to typically spread their
bank accounts across very few banks only.
At date zero, local banks can invest in long-term projects (“mortgages”)
of location s or short-term securities, and they can invest in short-term secu-
rities in period 1, but they cannot invest in long-term securities. Long-term
projects pay oﬀ only in period 2. I assume that long-term projects cannot
be terminated (“liquidated”) prematurely and that they require nonnegative
investments in period 0. I assume that local banks administer the local long-
term projects, delivering their payment streams to whoever ﬁnances them
originally.
I allow local banks to open accounts with the core banks, depositing
resources in period 0 and taking withdrawals in period 1 and/or period 2.
Again, for some unspeciﬁed cost reasons, we assume that local banks operate
a deposit account only with one of the core banks.
Core banks invest the period-0 deposits received from local banks in local
long-term projects, and turn their period-2 payments into long-term securi-
ties. In all periods, core banks can trade in short-term as well as long-term
securities.
In the aggregate “boom” state, local long-term projects return Rboom+
ǫs, where ǫs is a random variable with mean zero, distributed independently
and identically across locations s ∈ [0,1]. Long-term securities pool these
risks1. Thus, in the aggregate “boom” state, the long-term securities all
1To provide this with a bit of formal structure, suppose there are m = 1,...,M long-
term securities, suppose that (Am)M
m=1 is a partition of [0,1] with each Am having equal
Lebesque measure, and suppose that the payoﬀ for the long term security with index
m is the integral of all long-term projects s ∈ Am. The law of large numbers in Uhlig
(1996) then implies the safe return here. Conversely, knowning the return of the long-term
securities, one might directly assume that the long-term projects return this amount plus
the idiosynchratic noise ǫs. This structure can also be used for the “bust” episode. I will
not make further use of this formal structure, though.
11return Rboom . I assume that
ϕu(0) + (1 − ϕ)u(Rboom) < u(1) (2)




If u(c) is CRRA with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution below unity
and if Rboom > 1, both equations are satisﬁed. Further, (2) is generally
satisﬁed, if (1 − ϕ)Rboom < 1.
In the “bust” state, each long term securities oﬀers a safe2 return R, but
these returns are heterogeneous and distributed according to R ∼ F, drawn
from some distribution F on some interval [R, ¯ R], where 0 < R ≤ ¯ R < ∞,
with unconditional expectation Rbust, satisfying
Rbust ≤ Rboom (4)
Once the aggregate state is revealed to be a “bust” in period 1, I assume
that core banks all know the type of long-term securities in their portfolio,
i.e. know the period-2 return of the securities in their portfolio, and by
implication the return distribution of their securities. The entire portfolio
of the long-term securities has the safe return Rbust, and I will assume the
same for the portfolio for any core bank. Particular long-term securities
within that portfolio have diﬀerent returns, however. An outside investor
who buys one particular security, and e.g. draws a random security from the
entire pool therefore exposes himself to that return risk.
But even for the entire portfolio, the composition and its average (or
total safe) return is assumed to be unknown to depositors and local banks.
Insteady, they form heterogeneous beliefs about that. I assume that local
banks at location s and its depositors believe their core bank to hold a
portfolio with return distribution F( ;s), where F( ; ) is measurable and
2It is not hard to generalize this to risky returns, but the additional insights may be
small. From the perspective of outside investors, who do not know the speciﬁc R, the
returns will be uncertain, and this is what matters.




so that aggregate beliefs accurately reﬂect the aggregate distribution, but
there is a potential disagreement at the local level. None of the results
appear to depend on (5), however.
For simplicity, I shall assume that core banks actually all hold exactly
the same portfolio, i.e. there is a mismatch between the beliefs of the local
banks and the portfolio of their core bank. I assume that core banks do
not know the belief F( ;s) of their local banks at date 0 and contracting
time3 and cannot condition permitted withdrawals on these beliefs at time
1 or time 2. One possible interpretation of the heterogeneity in beliefs is
that it arises from heterogeneous signals arriving at each location, otherwise
starting from a common prior. With that interpretation, one needs to insist
on local banks not updating their beliefs in light of the actions of other local
banks in the analysis below, however. There may be a version of the model,
where the local signal is suﬃciently strong so as to overwhelm the market
information contained in the withdrawal decisions of all other local banks:
further research may be able to tell.
Finally, there is a large pool of outside investors i ∈ [0,∞). These in-
vestors can invest in the long-term securities or the short-term securities in
period 1, though not in period 0. Each investor is endowed with one unit of
resources. I do not allow them to engage in short-selling. They are assumed
to be risk neutral, discounting the future at some rate β, with
βRboom < 1 (6)
It remains to specify the information and beliefs of these investors. I shall
investigate three variants.
3E.g., suppose that the believes are F(R;s) = F∗(R;s+Xmod1), where X is a random
variable uniformly distributed on [0,1] and drawn at date 1 and F∗( ; ) is a commonly
known function.
131. [Benchmark:] As a benchmark, I assume that outside investors are
risk-neutral, discounting resources between period 1 and period 2 at
rate β. Furthermore, I assume that core banks sell bundles of their long-
term securities, which have the same return distribution as their total
portfolio (or, equivalently, sell randomly selected long-term securities,
but cannot “adversely select” the long-term security they wish to sell).
2. [Uncertainty Aversion:] I assume the investors to be uncertainty
averse, following Schmeidler (1989) or Epstein (1999). Alternatively,
one may interpret these investors as following robust control rules
against downside risks, following Hansen and Sargent (2008). There
may also be an interpretation as extreme loss aversion, following Tver-
sky and Kahnemann (1991) and Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001).
In either case, I presume the following starkly simpliﬁed structure: at
the cost of more complexitiy, this is not hard to generalize. Given a
security drawn from a pool of securities with some interval as the sup-
port of its returns, these investors are willing to pay β times the lower
bound of this interval as the price per unit invested, i.e. the investor
is risk neutral, but minimizes over all probability distributions with
support on that interval.
Let ω ≥ 0. The group i ∈ [0,ω] of these investors is assumed to have
the expertise of discerning the quality of the long-term securities, i.e.
they know the return of a given long-term security, the support interval
is a single number, and they are therefore willing to buy them when
the return exceeds 1/β. I call them the expert investors. All other
investors i > ω only know the distribution F and the equilibrium, but
not the speciﬁc return of some oﬀered long-term security. They use the
support interval [R, ¯ R] and are therefore willing to pay
βR
per unit invested.
14Another way of reading these preferences is that investors are suspi-
cious or perhaps even paranoid. If oﬀered to trade a security from the
described set, they will fear that they will always be oﬀered the secu-
rity with the lowest of these returns, even though this cannot happen
to all investors in equilibrium. A third interpretation is that these are
traders working on behalf of institutional investors drawn to the proﬁt
opportunities in the market, who face lopsided incentives for investing
in a bust market: due to the complexity of these securities, they cannot
aﬀord to risk loosing money ex post, as their managers may not be able
to tell whether this was indeed just a case of bad luck or a case of poor
research.
3. [Adverse Selection:] I assume that outside investors are risk-neutral,
discounting period-2 payoﬀs at rate β, but cannot distinguish between
the qualities of the long-term securities sold to them. I assume that
core banks can “adversely select” the long-term security they wish to
sell. I assume in this scenario, that all investors know that all core
banks hold a portfolio of long-term securities with return distribution
R ∼ F(R).
The timing of the events is now as follows. In period 0, core banks oﬀer
deposit contracts to local banks, oﬀering state-uncontingent withdrawals of
r in period 1 per unit deposited. Local banks oﬀer state-uncontingent with-
drawals of ˜ r in period 1 per unit deposited. In period 1 and depending on
the aggregate state, local banks may withdraw r from their core bank. The
core banks match these withdrawal demands from payoﬀs of their portfolio
of short-term securities as well as sales of long-term securities. If they can-
not meet all withdrawal demands, they declare bankruptcy. In that case, I
assume that all local banks, who have decided to withdraw, obtain an equal
pro-rata payment, splitting the entire resources of the bankrupt core bank
across local banks in proportion to their withdrawal demands.
15I assume that Bertrand competition in these contracts makes local banks
pay out everything to their depositors4 and likewise makes core banks pay
out everything to local banks. Therefore, any resources left in period 2 will
be paid in proportion to the remaining deposits. Furthermore, local banks
will be indiﬀerent which particular core bank to choose. Let
ν : [0,1] → {1,...,N}
be the core bank selection function, i.e. let ν(s) be the core bank selected by
the local bank s. I assume ν( ) to be measurable5 In the numerical examples,
I will let ν(s) = max{n | n < Ns + 1}, i.e. assume that the local banks
distribute themselves uniformly across core banks. To analyze what happens
when the number of distressed banks increases, I consider in particular the
case, where a fraction   of the core banks (in terms of their market share)
face the same heterogeneous beliefs of their local banks, whereas a fractio
1−  of core banks has local banks, who all (accurately) believe the portfolio
of their core bank to be given by securities with R ∼ F(R). It turn to
the speciﬁcs for that assumption in the numerical example in subsection 5.4
for the uncertainty-aversion case and provide results as part of the general
analysis in section 6 for the adverse selection case.
Finally and for simplicity, I assume that the “bust” state is suﬃciently
unlikely a priori, so that r and ˜ r are determined entirely from the “boom”
state calculus6.
4For that, one may want to assume that there are at least two local banks in each
location, though that assumption is immaterial for the rest of the analysis
5An alternative is to assume ν( ) to be random and use Pettis integration, see Uhlig
(1996).
6It would not make much diﬀerence for the analysis, if instead one were to calculate r
and ˜ r from a full probabilistic analysis.
164 Analysis: Preliminaries
It is useful to ﬁrst analyze some special cases in order to set the stage of
the analysis of the bust state. The analysis of these special cases are the
same, no matter which assumption has been made about the type of outside
investors.
4.1 No core banks
Consider ﬁrst the environment above without core banks. The investors then
do not matter: they would love to short-sell the short-term securities, but
they cannot do so (and that certainly seems reasonable, if one imagines the
short-term securities to be Treasury bills). In that case, local banks oﬀer
contracts to their local depositors. Note that all their depositors wish to
either only consume at date 1 or at date 2. Due to local Bertrand competition,
the local banks will choose the deposit contract that maximizes expected
utility (1).
Consider ﬁrst the choice between investing everything in the long term
project versus investing everything in short-term securities. In the ﬁrst case,
depositors only get to consume in case they turn out to be late consumers,
and their ex ante utility is
U = ϕu(0) + (1 − ϕ)E[u(R)] ≤ ϕu(0) + (1 − ϕ)u(Rboom)
due to concavity of u( ) as well as (4). In the second case, depositors can
consume in both periods, at ex ante utility equal to u(1). If the choice
is “either-or” and since the latter is larger than the former due to (2), local
banks will only invest in short-term securities. One can view this as a version
of 100% reserve banking. Note that there cannot be a bank run or ﬁnancial
crisis in this situation, but, as is well known and as we shall see, this solution
is ineﬃcient.
Generally,
U(y) = ϕu(y) + (1 − ϕ)u((1 − y)Rboom + y)
17is a concave function of the fraction y invested in the short-term security:
the corner solution y = 1 obtains, if
(1 − ϕ)Rboom < 1 (7)
and otherwise one obtains an interior solution. The ineﬃciency still remains,
see the discussion in Allen and Gale (2007), chapter 3.
4.2 Only “boom” state
To set the stage of the “bust” state analysis as well as an important bench-
mark, consider the situation with only a boom state. Competition drives
banks to maximize the ex-ante welfare of depositors. This amounts to choos-
ing the amount x to be invested in the long-term securities, y to be invested in
the short-term security and the amount z of the investment in the long-term
security to be sold to outside investors at date 1 in order to solve
max
x,y,z ϕu(c1) + (1 − ϕ)u(c2)
s.t. ϕc1 = y + βRboomz
(1 − ϕ)c2 = Rboom(x − z)
0 ≤ x, 0 ≤ y, x + y = 1, 0 ≤ z ≤ x
c2 ≥ c1 ≥ 0
where the last constraint prevents local banks in locations with late con-
sumers to withdraw their funds in period 1 and investing in the short security.
Note that the optimal solution will have z = 0 due to (6): it is cheaper to
deliver resources for period 1 per investing in the short-term security rather
than investing it in the long-term security and selling it at a steep discount to
the outside investors. With the interpretation of the sale to outside investors
as the liquidation value of long-term projects, this problem is a baseline prob-
lem in the literature on banking and has been thoroughly analyzed in the
literature, see e.g. Allen and Gale (2007), in particular chapter 3. A brief
description of the solution is useful for the analysis below, however.










holds: generally, this is rather far from being a sharp bound.
The period-1 withdrawals oﬀered by the deposit contracts are
r = ˜ r = c1 =
y
ϕ
and the bank invests
x = 1 − ϕr (10)
in long term securities. As is well-understood, the solution is more eﬃcient
than the solution with 100% reserve banking of subsection 4.2, but poten-
tially subject to bank runs. For example, if preferences are CRRA with an




, where 0 < σ < 1 (11)
and if Rboom > 1, then (3) is satisﬁed and
r =
￿










There are perhaps two twists compared to the standard solution. First,
core bank runs (i.e. local banks running on the core banks) can occur but
they invoke the resale of long-term securities to outside investors at the mar-
ket discount rate rather than the early termination of projects. This already
could be viewed as a solution to the task set forth in the introduction of cre-
ating a bank-on-bank run in terms of marketable securities. It is obviously
a rather trivial solution, as it simply amounts to one of many possible inter-
pretations of the standard bank run model. That literature is typically silent
19on what it means to “liquidate” the long-term projects, and selling them at
a steep discount certainly is consistent with these models.
Second, aside from liquidity provision, the core banks also oﬀer insurance
against the idiosynchratic ﬂuctuations in the returns of long-term projects.
Consider a slightly diﬀerent environment, in which local depositors split into
fractions ϕ of early consumers and (1 − ϕ) of late consumers at each lo-
cation. The local bank may still solve a problem as above, but with the
random return Rboom +ǫs in place of the safe return Rboom. It is obvious,
that the solution involving securitization is welfare improving compared to
this “local-only” solution, which exposes local depositors to additional lo-
cal risks. Moreover, it is more likely to trigger “fundamental” bank runs,
where long-term depositors run on the local bank, if Rboom + ǫs < c1. In-
deed, absent intermediation by core banks, these fundamental bank runs
are welfare-improving compared to regulating that deposit contracts need
to avoid fundamental bank runs at the local level: these bank runs provide
a partial substitute to the missing insurance market, see Allen and Gale
(2007). Put diﬀerently, securitization improves welfare and makes the sys-
tem less prone to local bank runs, but exposes it instead to the possibility
of “systemic” runs on core banks and thereby to “contagion” across diﬀerent
locations. This interdependence has been analyzed in the literature previ-
ously, see e.g. the exposition in chapters 5 and 10 of Allen and Gale (2007),
and the literature discussion there.
4.3 The “bust” state and the classic bank run case
To analyze the full model, we assume that the probability of the “bust”
state is vanishingly small7. It therefore remains to analyze the “bust” state,
ﬁxing the ﬁrst-period withdrawal r of the deposit contracts and the total
investments r in the short-term securities and the long-term securities 1 − r
as provided by the solution to the “boom”-only situation above.
7Alternatively, assume that the “bust” state was “irrationally” ignored at the time the
deposit contracts were signed.




where I use the argument “(0)” to denote that the fraction zero of local banks
in locations with late consumers run. Therefore, if c2,bust(0) < r, there will
be a fundamental bank run, even if core banks hold the same “market”
portfolio of long-term securities and local banks believe them to do so, as
insurance against the “boom-bust” aggregate uncertainty is not available.




Suppose even further, that all long-term securities oﬀer the return Rbust
and that a fraction θ of all local banks serving late consumers opt for early
withdrawal. The following algebra is well understood, but will be useful for
comparison to the more general case. The core banks meet the additional
liquidity demands by selling a fraction ζ of its long-term portfolio or z = xζ
units of its long-term securities to obtain additional liquidity ℓ, where
rθ(1 − ϕ) = ℓ = βRbust(1 − ϕ)ζ (14)
The securities are discounted by outside investors at q = β and 1/β is the
opportunity cost in terms of period-2 resources for providing one unit of






























21If θ∗ < 0, there is a fundamental bank run: all local banks will try to
withdraw early, because even if no one else did, second-period consumption
would be below the promised withdrawal at date 1, c2(0) < r. Fundamental
bank runs may actually be welfare-improving, as they partially complete
missing, markets, see Allen and Gale (2007). If 0 < θ∗ < 1, there is scope
for a Diamond-Dybvig “sunspot” bank run. If late-consumer local banks
believe that the fraction of early withdrawals by late-consumer local banks
exceeds θ∗, they will withdraw early too, so that θ = 1 in equilibrium. If
late-consumer local banks believe that the fraction of early withdrawals by
late-consumer local banks is below θ∗, they will choose to wait until period
2, and θ = 0 in equilibrium.
There are therefore three scenarios, namely a fundamental bank run, a
a Diamond-Dybvig “sunspot” bank run and no bank run. I call these the
“classic bank run” scenarios, for comparison with the more general case to
be analyzed below.
5 The “bust” state with uncertainty averse
investors.
Before proceeding to analyze the problem of a single core bank, consider
the dependence of the market price for any security, in dependence of the
aggregate liquidation L of long-term securities. If L < ω , there is an “excess
supply” of expert investors. They will bid more than non-expert uncertainty-
averse investors for the securities sold: therefore, the market price will be
the ﬁnal payoﬀ, discounted at β. If L > ω (and, by assumption, if L = ω),
however, the “marginal” investor is an uncertainty-averse investor, willing
only to pay βR, regardless of the asset. This then must be the market price.
Thus, given some speciﬁc security, its market price is a decreasing function of
the aggregate liquidity needs L. This is the key feature needed in this section.
The market price also happens to fall discontinuously, as L crosses ω: this is
due to our particularly stark assumption regarding the uncertainty aversion of
22the outside investors and assuming a discontinuity at ω. This is not essential
to the results, and can be relaxed, at the price of higher complexity of the
analysis. The required general construction of an equilibrium has therefore
been postponed to appendix A, whereas the construction in subsection 5.2
relies on the two-step form of the demand function described above.
One way to read this section that it provides an alternative reason or
interpretation for the cash-in-market pricing as in Allen and Gale (1994) or
Allen and Gale (2007), chapter 4: there is unlimited amount of cash here, but
the “expert cash” is limited indeed. The cash-in-the-market pricing scenario
corresponds to an extreme version of the uncertainy averse investors, where
the non-expert investors are bidding zero for all assets. In Allen and Gale
(2007) therefore, the core banks cannot raise more liquidity than ω: should
they reach that point, the sales price for their assets will be determined by the
cash-in-the-market pricing, thereby determining the payoﬀ for all depositors
in period 1 by a now bankrupt system. In contrast, the analysis below allows
for partial bankruns: as core banks need to provide more liquidity than is in
the hands of the expert investors, they will suﬀer steep opportunity costs in
terms of period 2 resources. Nonetheless, suﬃcient funds may be left over in
period 2 to pay of the remaining late-withdrawing local banks.
5.1 The problem of a single core bank and its local
banks.
Consider a core bank and suppose that a fraction θ of its local banks at late-
consuming locations withdraw early. If L < ω, so that only expert investors
are present, the opportunity costs in terms of period-2 resources for providing
one unit of resources for period-1 withdrawals is 1β. If L ≥ ω, however, the
core bank obtains the market price βR, regardless of the security sold. It will
therefore sell its securities with the lowest period-2 payoﬀ ﬁrst. Suppose the
core bank started initially with   resources. It therefore purchased (1−ϕr) 
units of long-term securities. Given the early withdrawals, the core bank
23needs to raise period-1 liquidity ℓ = rθ(1−ϕ) , and hence sell ℓ/(βR) units






similar to equation (14).
Consider now one of its local banks and its beliefs F(   ;s) about the
return distributions of the securities in the portfolio of its core bank (before
selling any of its securities). For ease of notation, I shall write G in place of
F( ;s). Let
G
−1(τ) = sup{R | G(R) < τ}, τ ∈ [0,1] (17)
be the inverse function of G, see ﬁgure 2. Note that






is the expected return of all returns below the level given by G−1(ζ), under
the distribution G. Also note that G−1(τ) is a continuous function of τ and
EG[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ)] is a continuous function of ζ.
From the perspective of this local bank, the period-2 opportunity costs















is the eﬀective liquidation discount rate of period-2 resources.
Proposition 1 1. Γ(θ,L;G) is increasing and continuous in θ.
2. Γ(θ,L;G) is increasing in L and satisﬁes βΓ(θ,L;G) ≥ 1. There is no
dependence on L, if ω = 0 or if ω = ∞, i.e. in the absence of expert





Figure 2: The function G−1 and expected returns.
3. Suppose that H ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates G. Then
Γ(θ,L;G) ≤ Γ(θ,L;H)
i.e. Γ(θ,L;G) is increasing in G, when ordering distributions by ﬁrst-
order stochastic dominance.
Proof:
1. Note that ζ(θ) and therefore EG[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ(θ))] is increasing in θ.
Continuity is a consequence of the continuity of ζ(θ,L) in θ.
252. Note that R
−1EG[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ(θ))] ≥ 1.
3. Deﬁne H−1 as the inverse of H as in 17. Since H(R) ≤ G(R) for
all R, H−1(τ) ≥ G−1(τ) for all τ ∈ [0,1]. Equation (18) shows that
EG[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ)] ≤ EH[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ)] and the claim follows.
•
As a result, a local bank with beliefs G = F( ;s) perceives the second-





if there are no withdrawals of late-consumer local banks in period 1, i.e. if
θ = 0. With withdrawals of a fraction θ of late-consumer local banks, the






which generalizes (15). The local bank will therefore surely opt for period-1
withdrawal, if c2(θ,L;G) < r.
It may be useful to note that c2(θ,L;G) is not monotone in G, when
ordering G according to ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance: while the ﬁrst term
is increasing in G, the second term is now decreasing, due to the negative
sign. Indeed, it is easy to construct examples for both a decreasing or an
increasing behaviour, by keeping one of the terms nearly unchanged while
the other moves signiﬁcantly.
However, c2(θ,L;G) is monotonously decreasing in L and furthermore, it
is decreasing in θ under the mild condition (22), which generalizes (9) and
which essentially assures, that no late-withdrawal local bank will be happy
about other late consumer local banks withdrawing early. For the following
proposition, the properties of Γ in proposition (1) suﬃce: this is useful, if
26generalizing the results in this paper to a smooth transition between expert
investors and non-expert investors.
Proposition 2 Assume that Γ( , ; ) satisﬁes the properties listed in propo-
sition (1). Then,
1. c2(θ,L;G) is monotonously decreasing in L.






Then c2(θ,L;G) is strictly decreasing in θ.
Proof:
1. This follows directly from proposition 1.
2. Continuity follows from the continuity of Γ(θ,L;G) in θ.
3. Write c2(θ,L;G) as





χ(θ,L;G) = rΓ(θ,L;G) − c2(0;G) (24)
is strictly positive and increasing in θ per (22) and proposition 1. Let
θa < θb. Then















To analyze the equilibrium, I shall now exploit that the dependence of Γ on
L is the two-step threshold function given by (19). This particular form is
rather special, however, and arises from the rather stark assumption regard-
ing the diﬀerence between expert investors and other investors. Appendix A
provides an analysis of the equilibrium also just under the assumption, that Γ
satisﬁes the properties listed in proposition 1. It also contains a more formal
deﬁnition of equilibrium.
With the two-step threshold function given by (19), each local bank needs
to consider aggregate liquidity L only through the event that L < ω or that
L ≥ ω.
Assume that (22) is true for all conjectured distributions G = F( ,s).
Therefore, if local banks opt for early withdrawals at some level of market
liquidity or some fraction of other early withdrawals, they will do also for
higher levels of L and θ. As in appendix A, let
Sn(θ,L) = {s | ν(s) = n, c2(θ,L;F( ,s)) < r} (25)
be the set of local banks with deposits at core banks n, which will surely
withdraw early, if a fraction θ of depositors at core bank n do, and if there
is total liquidity demand L.
Given L and a core bank n, deﬁne the mappings
ηn,L : [0,1] → [0,1]
per
ηn,L(θ) = λ(Sn(θ,L))
28where λ( ) denotes the Lebesgue measure. Intuitively, if aggregate liquidity
needs are given by L and if all local banks at core bank n conjecture the
fractions θ of late consumer local banks to withdraw early at that core bank,
then the fractions ηn,L(θ) surely will. Fixed points of η are bank runs, where
withdrawers strictly prefer to do so.
Proposition 3 Assume that (22) is true for all conjectured distributions
G = F( ,s).
1. ηn,L : [0,1] → [0,1] is increasing and continuous from the left, i.e. for
θj → θ∞, θj < θ∞, we have ηn,L(θj) → ηn,L(θ∞).
2. Given n, L, let θ0 = 0 and construct the sequence
θj;n,L = ηn,L(θj−1;n,L)
Then θj;n,L → θ∞;n,L, which satisﬁes θ∞;n,L = ηn,L(θ∞;n,L). Further-
more,
θ∞;n,L = min{θ | θ ≥ ηn,L(θ)} (26)
Proof:
1. This follows from proposition 2.
2. The ﬁrst part follows from the ﬁrst part. For (26), consider any θ <
θ∞;n,L. Therefore, for some j,
θj−1;n,L ≤ θ < θj;n,L = ηn,L(θj−1;n,L) ≤ ηn,L(θ)




θ ∞;L = (θ∞;1,L,...,θ∞;N,L)
29If L(
− →
θ ∞;0) < ω, then this is a partial fundamental bank run, but it does
not have any systemic feature. If L(
− →
θ ∞;0) > ω, however, then pick any8
˜ ω > ω. The partial fundamental bank run is now given by
− →
θ ∞;˜ ω, and it
involves a systemic spillover. Intuitively (and along the sequence constructed
above), as more local banks become skeptical about the remaining resources
at their core banks, more core banks need to obtain liquidity in period 1,
eventually exceeding the resources supplied by expert investors. This leads
to a decline (here, a collapse) in period 1 prices, exacerbating the problem.
Note that at L(
− →
θ ∞;˜ ω) > ω and therefore, c2(θ,L;F( ,s)) is continuous in
L around L = L(
− →
θ ∞;˜ ω), thereby satisfying the assumption in the last part
of proposition (6).
5.3 The “bust” state with risk-neutral investors and
no adverse selection.
Suppose instead (and as a benchmark for comparison), that investors are
risk-neutral and that there is no adverse selection in selling the long-term
securities. This may be a sensible assumption if all long-term securities
return the same amount Rbust, despite the heterogenous beliefs of the local
banks to the contrary. Or this may be sensible, if one were to assume that
core banks can only sell well-deﬁned (or well-audited) portfolios of long-term
securities, whose risk-characteristics are known to the market. Finally, this
may be sensible if one is to assume that ω = ∞ in the analysis above. In all
these cases, the outside investors discount future payments at rate β.
The analysis of the “bust” state is now a corollary to the analysis above
by setting ω = ∞ and using Γ(θ,L;G) = 1/β throughout. The details can be
skipped, except perhaps for some useful formulas. With (21), second-period
8Technically, given my assumptions, it suﬃces to check L(
− →
θ ∞;0) = ω and to pick
˜ ω = ω. But this is a knife edge case, which I have resolved somewhat arbitrarily per
assumption.





which is monotone in G, when ordering distributions according to ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance, and which does not depend on L (and where I use the
˜   to distinguish it from the scenario above). As in (16) , a late consumer local













This scenario will serve as a benchmark. While there can also be a fun-
damental bank run in this case, there is no spillover to other core banks.
A fundamental bank run in this scenario and the scenario with uncertainty
averse investors start the same and aﬀect the same core banks. However, a
fundamental bank run with uncertainty averse investors can run considerably
deeper.
5.4 A numerical example
To provide a speciﬁc, illustrative example, suppose that σ = 1/2, Rboom =
1.44 and ϕ = 1/7. Equation (12) then implies
c1 = r =
7
6









Assume that β = 2/3, therefore satisfying (6). Assume that 10% of the
returns are uniformly distributed on [0.6,1.4], whereas 90% are equal to 1.4
in the bust state: this is the aggregate distribution F, see ﬁgure 3. Therefore,
Rbust = 1.36. Note that (13) is violated, and that therefore there is no
fundamental bank run with complete information in the bust state or if the
beliefs F( ,s) of all local banks coincide with the asset distribution.
Assume that for a fraction (1−  ) of core banks, local banks assume the
correct aggregate distribution, and will therefore not run in a fundamental















Figure 3: Return distribution in the bust state.
bank run equilibrium. However, for the remaining fraction   of the core
banks, the local banks believe with certainty that the return is some return
R, where R is randomly drawn from F. I.e., if the local banks of these core
banks are enumerated τ ∈ [0;1], then Γ(τ) = 0.6 + 8τ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ 0.1 and
Γ(τ) = 1.4 for τ ≥ 0.1. As a result, the local banks are correct in aggregate,
but wrong individually, see ﬁgure 4
Absent a bank run, each late consumer local bank expects a pay out of
c2(0;F( ;τ)) = Γ(τ)
35
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Even for the most optimistic bank, I have










Therefore, the condition (22) is satisﬁed for all G = F( ;s).














Suppose ﬁrst, that there are only risk neutral investors (or only expert
investors), as in subsection 5.3. In that case, (28) can be used to calculate
the fundamental bank run, if it exists, by calculating the smallest τ so that
θ∞;n,0 = ˜ θ
∗(F( ;τ)) = τ
where I have also used the notation θ∞;n,0 to denote the fraction of local banks
at one of the aﬀected core banks, say with index n, if aggregate liquidity
demands L are believed to be below ω (or L = 0, for simplicity). The
solution is approximately θ∞;n,0 = 0.0811, i.e. 8 percent of late consumer
local banks will decide to run, see ﬁgure 5.
In the scenario with uncertainty averse investors, note that
L = L(θ) = rθ(1 − ϕ)  (29)











Figure 5: Bankrun calculus when only expert investors are present.
so that the market price drops to the uncertainty-averse investor price βR
as a function of θ, when θ exceeds the threshold value θcrit given by
θcrit =
ω




since my numerical values happen to imply r(1 − ϕ) = 1. Put diﬀerently,
the given expertise of outside investors will be diluted, the more core banks
are aﬀected by withdrawals, “accelerating” the bank run compared to the
experts-only scenario. It is in this sense, that the bank run is systemic.
Conversely, the experts-only partial bank run described above is not an
equilibrium, if θ∞;n,0 > θcrit or
ω
 
< θ∞;n,0r(1 − ϕ) ≈ 0.0811, (30)
34i.e. if the fraction of aﬀected core banks is somewhat above 12 times the re-
sources of the expert investors relative to the entire amount initially invested
in all securities.
To calculate the equilibrium in that case, consider a value L < ω and a
value L > ω. For each value, calculate c2(θ,L;F( ,θ)). Calculate the lowest
θ = τ so that
c2(θ,L;F( ,θ)) = r (31)
or, absent that and depending on the boundary conditions, either θ = τ = 0,
if c2 > r always, or θ = τ = 1, if c2 < r always.
The resulting second-period consumption is shown in ﬁgure 6. If L > ω,
the graph shows that θ = 1, i.e. a run on all core banks aﬀected by doubtful
local banks, as the only solution. By contrast, there are multiple solutions
to (31), if L < ω. Therefore, if (30) holds, a system-wide bank run on the
fraction   of the core banks, which are subject to heterogeneous beliefs by
their local banks, results, while the other 1−  core banks remain unaﬀected
(unless there is a Diamond-Dybvig sunspot-type bank run). Variations of this
example can produce partial fundamental bank runs as well. Furthermore
and in a generalized version of this model, if Γ varies smoothly with L,
ﬁgure 6 suggests a critical value as the c2-curve is shifted downwards with
increasing L, when the equilibrium close to the small expert-only partial
bank run disappears and only the system-wide bank run on the aﬀected core
banks remains.
6 The “bust” state with adverse selection.
Consider now the variation of the model with adverse selection. More pre-
cisely, assume the outside investors to be risk-neutral, discounting the future
at rate β. I assume that all outside investors are non-experts9, and can
therefore not distinguish between long-term securities oﬀered to them, while
9It would not be hard but a bit tedious, to generalize this and to include expert investors
as well.
















Figure 6: Consumption of local banks that wait until the second period, assum-
ing that all banks with τ < θ run, and banks with τ > θ do not. Comparison
to c1 = r.
core banks selling them know the returns exactly, and can choose which se-
curity to sell. I assume that outside investors know the return distribution
F. All the long-term securities are therefore sold at the same market price p.
This creates adverse selection: not only will core banks sell the securities with
their worst quality ﬁrst (and this happens in the analysis above as well, when
selling to non-expert investors), but furthermore, some core banks without
liquidity needs due to withdrawals may sell long-term securities of low qual-
ity, if the price is right. The latter is a key diﬀerence between the adverse
selection variant and the uncertainty aversion variant presented here: with
uncertainty averse investors and suﬃciently high discounting, there never is
36a reason for “opportunistic” selling by liquid core banks10
To keep the analysis a bit more tractable, assume that the true portfolio
F is atomless. Suppose that core banks with a market share   face early
withdrawals of the same11 fraction θ of their late-consumer serving local
banks, due to heterogeneous beliefs of their local banks. They need to sell a
share ζ of their portfolio or z =  xζ of their long-term securities, where
rθ(1 − ϕ)  = p xζ (32)
On average, these securities pay EG[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ)] per unit, see equation
(18).
Assume that the other core banks have local banks who all correctly
believe the core-bank portfolio to have securities with returns distributed
according to R ∼ F(R). These core banks will sell long-term securities for
purely opportunistic reasons, in case their price exceeds the expected return.
Given a market price p for long-term securities, core banks without early
withdrawals will sell all12 securities with R ≤ p, i.e. sell the fraction F(p).
The outside investors are risk neutral, discounting the future at β, but
understand this adverse selection problem. By assumption, they correctly
assume the securities in the portfolios of the core banks to have the return
distributions R ∼ F(R).. Therefore, the market clearing price13 p = p(θ, )
10Clearly, the distinction here has been sharply drawn, for analytic purposes. It may
well be that some mixture of the two variants is a better description than one of these two
extreme variants.
11It is straightforward, but tedious to extend this to the case, where θ diﬀers from core
bank to core bank.
12For equality, there is indiﬀerence, and therefore core banks may only sell a fraction of
the securities for which there is a equality. The issue does not arise, if F( ) is atomless, as
I have assumed in this section. In the more general case, it will be easy to patch that up
at the ﬁnal step, when calculating market clearing. For reasons of tractability, I shall not
pursue this issue further.
13Note that the local banks considering withdrawals should be able to learn from the
market price, that their beliefs G for their core bank and the market price together are
inconsistent with the aggregate return distribution F, and should therefore somehow up-
37and the fraction of the portfolio ζ = ζ(θ, ) sold by the distressed core banks
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RdF, if p(θ, ) < R
and where F −1( ) is deﬁned as in (17). Note that the right hand side of (33)









as the maximal θ compatible with ζ ≤ 1, if p = βR. Note that ¯ θ < 1.
Proposition 4 1. For every θ ∈ [0, ¯ θ] and   ∈ (0,1], there is a unique
solution (p,ζ) to (33,34) with βR ≤ p ≤ βRbust and 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1, so
that p < F −1(ζ).
2. Given θ, p(θ, ) is a strictly increasing function in   ∈ (0,1].
Proof:
1. Recall that the support of F is [R, ¯ R]. Deﬁne the function ρ(p) per the
right hand side of (33), with ζ replaced with (34). Note that ρ(p) is
continuous on p ∈ [βR, ¯ R] with
ρ(βR) ≥ βR, ρ( ¯ R) ≤ βEF[R] = βRbust < ¯ R
date their belief, learning from the information revealed in market prices. This may be a
tough thing to do in practice, and I shall ignore this issue for the purpose of the analysis
here.
38By the mean value theorem, there is therefore a value p with p = ρ(p).
Suppose that F −1(ζ) ≤ p at this value. Then the right hand side of (33)
is not larger than βp, a contradiction. To show uniqueness, suppose to
the contrary that there are two solutions, say pa < pb, together with






RdF ≤ (F(pb) − F(pa))pb













+ (1 −  )F(p)p
(36)
Note that pj = ρ(pj) can be rewritten as
1 = ψ(pj,ζj;θ, ) (37)
for j = a,b. Therefore,
1 = ψ(pa,ζa;θ, ) =
β 
R F −1(ζa)












R RdF + β(1 −  )
R pa






























+ (1 −  )F(pb)pb
= ψ(pb,ζb;θ, )
and therefore, (37) cannot hold for pb, a contradiction.
2. Given θ, , denote the unique equilibrium with p(θ, ) and ζ(θ, ). Let
ζ(p) denote the expression on the right hand side of (34). The previous
39calculation shows more generally that
ψ(p,ζ(p);θ, ) > 1 for p < p(θ, ) (38)
ψ(p,ζ(p);θ, ) < 1 for p > p(θ, )
(39)





RdF < F(¯ p)¯ p
it follows that
β





Therefore, ψ(¯ p, ¯ ζ;θ, ) is increasing in  . For  ′ > ¯  , one therefore
has ψ(¯ p, ¯ ζ;θ, ′) > 1. It follows from (38) that p(θ, b) > p(θ, a), as
claimed.
•
At the distressed core banks, local banks with beliefs G regarding their
portfolio will therefore belief the opportunity costs for providing period-1
resources in terms of period-2 resources to be
Γ(θ, ;G) =
EG[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ(θ, ))]
p(θ, )
(40)
It is instructive to compare this to (19) for the case ω = 0: the two expressions
coincide iﬀ p(θ, ) = βR. Generally, the returns are quite diﬀerent. In fact,
Γ(θ,1;G) =
EG[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ(θ, ))]
βEF[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ)]
(41)






40Proposition 5 Γ(θ, ;G) is decreasing in  .
Proof: This is a direct consequence of (40) together with the fact that
p(θ, ) is increasing in  , implying that ζ(θ, ) and thus EG[R | R ≤ G−1(ζ)]
are decreasing in  . •
I obtain the key insight that an increasing market share of distressed banks
lessens rather than deepens the crisis. Furthermore, with homogeneous be-
liefs, F( ,s) ≡ F, and with the market share of distressed banks approaching
unity, the moral-hazard scenario turns into the standard bank run scenario
considered in section 4.3.












Therefore, a late-consumer-serving local bank in location s, banking with a
distressed core bank and believing that a fraction θ of local late-consumer
banks will withdraw in period 1 will choose to do so itself, if
c2(θ, ;G) ≤ r (44)
The analysis of the resulting equilibrium appears to be similar to the analysis
in section 5 and shall be omitted in the interest of space.
6.1 A numerical example
I use the same parameterization as in subsection 5.4. For low values of θ ≤ θ,
the market price will be below R = 0.6 and the required market discount
Γ(θ, ;F) at the true distribution will equal 1/β. For these low values of θ
and due to the uniform distribution, the market price equals
p(θ; ) = β
F −1(ζ) + 0.6
2
(45)
41Therefore, θ is low enough, iﬀ p(θ; ) ≤ 0.6 or, equivalently, F −1(ζ) ≤ 1.2.
By the parameterization in (5.4),
F
−1(ζ) = min{0.6 + 8ζ,1.4}
Therefore, F −1(ζ) ≤ 1.2 corresponds to ζ ≤ 0.075. To ﬁnd p and ζ when




















The solutions to (46) are therefore given by
ζ = −0.075 +
√
0.0752 + κθ
(where the negative root has been excluded as not sensible). Therefore,
ζ ≤ 0.075, if
θ ≤ θ = 3 ∗ 0.075
2/κ = 0.0375.
For θ > θ, the behavior of the price depends on market share of the dis-
tressed core banks. Two extreme scenarios can provide some general insights.
If   → 0, then the price will remain “stuck” at p = R = 0.6, as all remain-
ing banks would sell arbitrarily large chunks of their worst assets otherwise.
If   = 1, then discounting of future returns will remain to be done at the
discount rate β.
For these as well as the in-between range of values of  , equation (44) can
then be used to determine the treshold value for τ, up to which local banks
will decide to withdraw. Proposition (5) generally shows, that a bank run is
the less likely, the larger the market share of distressed core banks.
7 Some policy implications
Given the length of this paper, a full discussion of the policy implications is
beyond its scope. I shall also shy away from a welfare analysis. Instead, I
42investigate the more modest question of the impact of certain policies for a
policy maker who may be interested in learning the consequences for avoiding
(or stopping) a crisis and for the government budget. This section is written
under the assumption of the view described in the six-point list in the intro-
duction: obviously, if that view is incorrect, then the following conclusions
may no longer be applicable.
A key diﬀerence between the model with uncertainty averse investors and
the adverse selection are the implications, as the “suspicion” of bad portfolios
aﬀect not only a fraction of the core bank but all banks. In the case of
uncertainty averse investors, a given core bank now has even less access to
expert investors, worsening the situation. In the case of adverse selection,
and since all core banks need to obtain equal amounts of liquidity, they will
all receive “fair value” for their assets, i.e., the situation essentially turns
into a classic bank run. Therefore, the adverse selection scenario violates
item six of the stylized description list in the introduction, while the scenario
with uncertainty averse investors does not. For these reasons, I argue that
it is more plausible to look at the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis through the lense
of the uncertainty averse investor scenario rather than the adverse selection
scenario.
Consider, for example, a government guarantee of payoﬀs of the securi-
ties sold by the core banks, e.g. guaranteeing a return of at least Rgov. In
that case, the uncertainty averse investors will pay βRgov instead of βR. In
particular, if Rgov = 1, i.e. if the government guarantees that investments
will not make losses, the “deep” bank run results in discounting with β
throughout and turns the scenario with uncertainty averse investors into the
“classic” bankrun situation of subsection 5.3 for the distressed core banks.
The government will loose money on all securities with returns R < Rgov.
Additionally, if βRgov > R, the government now creates an additional ad-
verse selection problem at the core banks which are not distressed, and which
now ﬁnd it at their advantage to sell all assets with R ≤ R ≤ βRgov.
From the tax payers perspective, a more advantageous procedure in the
43case of uncertainty averse investors seems to be the purchase of the troubled
assets outright: if large parts of the portfolios of banks are bought, the tax
payer will receive the average payoﬀ and not the bottom payoﬀ as feared
by the outside investors. Consider a ﬁxed government purchase price p at
which the government stands ready to purchase assets from the core banks.
The incentives of the participating core banks then become similar to the
analysis in the adverse selection framework: while the distressed core banks
will sell for sure, the core banks without distress will only do so if it is in
their interest to sell the worst assets. Rather than imposing the equilibrium
condition (33), one can then calculate the losses or gains to the tax payers at
the mandated government purchase price. If that price is below the adverse
selection scenario equilibrium price, the government will earn a return above
1/β, and this scenario is possible and plausible, if investors are uncertainty
averse. If the situation is as described in the adverse selection scenario, then
the government would only ﬁnd takers for its oﬀers, if the government price
is above the current market clearing price, in which case the government will
make losses compared to the benchmark return of 1/β.
Since I have argued that the uncertainty averse scenario is more plau-
sible than the adverse selection scenario, the analysis here provides some
support for the argument that an outright purchase of troubled assets by
the government at prices above current market prices can both alleviate the
ﬁnancial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe
securities.
A number of private sector solutions may likewise provide reasonable
avenues for resolving the crisis situation, e.g. the complete purchase of port-
folios of a distressed core bank or the sale of a distressed core bank and a
guarantee of its deposits through the buyer. It may be, however, that the
same caution that drives uncertainty averse investors to demand steep dis-
counts on asset backed securities might also prevent the sale of distressed
ﬁnancial institutions to the same investors at a price that can resolve the sit-
uation suﬃciently well. Solutions that mix private sector involvement with
44government intervention - an idea at the core of the Geithner plan - may
likewise oﬀer speciﬁc advantages or fallacies, that can be analyzed in this
context.
Follow-up work, providing a deeper analysis of the various options and
policy scenarios, is surely called for.
8 Conclusions
I have set out to provide a model of a systemic bank run delivering the
following features
1. The withdrawal of funds was done by ﬁnancial institutions at other
ﬁnancial institutions, rather than depositors at their bank.
2. The troubled ﬁnancial institutions held their portfolio in asset-backed
securities rather than being invested directly in long-term projects.
3. These securities are traded on markets. In the crisis, the prices for these
securities appears low compared to some benchmark fundamental value
benchmark (“underpricing”).
4. There is a large pool of investors willing to purchase securities, as evi-
denced e.g. by market purchases of newly issued US government bonds
or the volume on stock markets.
5. Nonetheless, these investors are only willing to buy these asset-backed
securities at prices that are low compared to standard discounting of
the entire pool of these securities.
6. The larger the market share of troubled ﬁnancial institutions, the steeper
the required discounts.
To that end, I have hypothesized two diﬀerent motives for outside investors
and their interaction with banks trading asset-backed securities: uncertainty
45aversion versus adverse selection. Both variants of the model are capable of
delivering on the ﬁrst ﬁve points of the list above. While the variant with
uncertainty averse investors also delivers on the sixth point, this is not the
case for the adverse selection scenario. Indeed there, as a larger share of
ﬁnancial institutions are distressed, the discounts lessen rather than rise.
I conclude from that that the variant with uncertainty averse investors
rather than the adverse selection scenario is more suitable to analyze policy
implications. This paper therefore provides a model, in which the outright
purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market
prices may both alleviate the ﬁnancial crises as well as provide tax payers
with returns above those for safe securities.
A number of private sector solutions may likewise provide reasonable av-
enues for resolving the crisis situation. Solutions that mix private sector
involvement with government intervention - an idea at the core of the Gei-
thner plan - may likewise oﬀer speciﬁc advantages or fallacies, that can be
analyzed in this context. Follow-up work, providing a deeper analysis of the
various options and policy scenarios, is surely called for.
46Appendix
A Equilibrium with uncertainty aversion: a
general case
I now seek to analyze the interplay between all n = 1,...,N core banks, some
of which may be subject to early withdrawals by their local banks. In terms
of the period-2 opportunity costs Γ(θ,L;G) for providing period-1 liquidity, I
shall only use the properties stated in proposition 1. Therefore, the analysis
here generalizes to a situation, where the dependence on L is smooth, as e.g.
in Allen and Gale (2007), chapter 4, rather than a step function as implied
by our stark assumptions about uncertainty aversion. While this is more
generality than is strictly needed for completing the analysis here, it is useful
for applying the analysis in this paper more generally. I return to the special
case of a liquidity threshold in subsection 5.2.
Let me start per deﬁning the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is collections (Sn)N
n=1 of subsets of [0,1], with-
drawal fractions (θn)N
n=1 and total additional liquidity L, so that
1. ν(s) = n for all s ∈ Sn, i.e. Sn are locations of banks banking with core
bank n.
2. θn = λ(Sn) is the Lebesgue measure of Sn.
3. For all s ∈ Sn: c2(θn,L;F( ,s)) ≤ r. For all s / ∈ Sn, ν(s) = n:
c2(θn,L;F( ,s)) ≥ r.
4. L = L(θ1,...,θn) where





where λ(ν−1(n)) is the Lebesgue measure of ν−1(n).
47Note that the actual portfolio of the core banks does not matter for calculat-
ing the withdrawal fractions: only the perception of their portfolio matters.
Obviously, the actual portfolio does matter for the realized date-2 payoﬀ of
the remaining late consumers.
Assume that (22) is true for all conjectured distributions G = F( ,s).
Therefore, if local banks opt for early withdrawals at some level of market
liquidity or some fraction of other early withdrawals, they will do also for
higher levels of L and θ. Let
Sn(θ,L) = {s | ν(s) = n, c2(θ,L;F( ,s)) < r} (48)
be the set of local banks with deposits at core banks n, which will surely
withdraw early, if a fraction θ of depositors at core bank n do, and if there














n = λ(Sn (θn,L(θ1,...,θN))) (49)
and where λ( ) denotes the Lebesgue measure. Intuitively, if everyone con-
jectures the fractions (θ1,...,θN) of late consumer local banks to withdraw









be the set of of conservative withdrawal conjecture vectors, i.e. actual with-
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Figure 7: The set Θ.
be a set of upper bounds for Θ and let
Θmax = {
− →
θ | There is ǫ ∈ I R
N




θ + ǫ] ∩ Θlim = {
− →
θ }} (52)





the set of all ˜ θ with
− →
θ ≤ ˜ θ ≤
− →
θ + ǫ.
Proposition 6 Assume that (22) is true for all conjectured distributions








θ together with L = L(
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θ )] ⊂ Θ (54)
3. ∅  = Θmax ⊂ Θlim ⊂ Θ.
4. Any
− →




θ 0 = (0,0,...,0). Consider the sequence
− →
θ j = h(
− →
θ j−1) (55)
This sequence converges to some
− →
θ ∞ ∈ [0,1]N. Any
− →




θ ∞. Suppose that all cs(θ,L;F( ,s)) are continuous in L at
L = L(
− →




θ ∞ and therefore has an equilibrium
associated with it.
Proof:
1. Check the equilibrium deﬁnition.










3. Per (22) or better (23),
h(1,1,...,1) = (1,1,...,1) (56)
for if everyone else withdraws early, so should you. Thus (1,1,...,1) ∈
Θmax, which is therefore not empty. The ﬁrst inclusion is trivial. For
14Since I have focussed here on ﬁnding equilibria per strict preference for withdrawal in
period 1, the converse may generally not be true.




























4. Assume additionally that
− →






But if instead (h(
− →
θ ))n > (
− →





θ )] ⊂ Θ would be a contradiction to local maximality.
5. Note that
− →
θ j is an increasing sequence in [0,1]N: it therefore must
converge. Let s ∈ Sn(
− →
θ ∞,L). Therefore, cs(
− →
θ ∞,L;F( ,s)) < r. By
continuity in θ, cs(
− →
θ j,L;F( ,s)) < r for all j suﬃciently large. Con-
versely, if cs(
− →
θ j,L;F( ,s)) < r, then cs(
− →













θ ∞) = lim
j h(
− →








θ ∈ Θmax. Since trivially
− →
θ ≥ (0,0,...,0), the conclusion follows






θ ∞, I call
− →
θ ∞ the partial fundamental bank
run. If (h(0,...,0)n = 0 for n ∈ N ⊂ {1,...,N}, then the same is true for
51− →
θ ∞. The fundamental bank run therefore only aﬀects the core banks, which
experience withdrawals “at the start” of the run, i.e. experience withdrawals
of late consumer local banks, even if all local banks assume that nobody
else withdraws. Nonetheless, withdrawals at one core bank can spill over to
withdrawals at other core banks within this set, due to the dependence of
Γ(θ,L;G) on aggregate liquidity, provided that ω is nonzero and suﬃciently
small.
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